






































































































































Help for Unemployed Borrowers: Lessons 
from the Pennsylvania Homeowners’ 
Emergency Mortgage Assistance Program
James Orr, John Sporn, Joseph Tracy, and Junfeng Huang
In an environment of high foreclosure rates and distressed housing 
markets, federal policies are focusing on loan modiﬁ  cations to help 
delinquent homeowners pay their mortgages. While it is too soon 
to assess the effectiveness of these modiﬁ  cations, policymakers 
considering future reﬁ  nements may gain insight from a more 
established, state-level enterprise that takes an alternative 
approach to mortgage relief. The Pennsylvania Homeowners’ 
Emergency Mortgage Assistance Program provides temporary 
income support to homeowners unable to pay their mortgage 
during a spell of unemployment. The program has helped most 
participants retain their homes while paying off their loans—
at a potentially lower cost than that of other relief initiatives.
C
ontinuing high levels of mortgage foreclosures and ongoing weakness in the 
housing market have spurred public policy interest in helping homeowners 
meet their mortgage payments. At the federal level, policies have centered on 
providing incentives for the modiﬁ  cation of delinquent mortgages. Prominent among 
the government’s efforts is the Home Affordable Modiﬁ  cation Program (HAMP), 
announced in March 2009.1 HAMP encourages lenders and servicers to modify the 
terms of the mortgage contract—in particular, the interest rate and maturity of the 
loan—in a way that increases affordability for homeowners. The rationale behind 
HAMP and similar interventions is that while home foreclosures impose costs on 
borrowers and lenders/servicers, they also undermine the value of other properties 
in neighborhoods where the foreclosed residences are located. 
A more recent federal effort to assist delinquent borrowers is the Emergency 
Homeowners’ Loan Program (EHLP), introduced by the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) in August 2010.2 This program provides interest-free 
loans to borrowers to pay arrearages plus a portion of their monthly mortgage 
when the borrowers experience a significant loss of income. Under the terms of 
the program, income loss can result not only from unemployment but also from 
underemployment or a medical emergency, and assistance is available for up to two 
1 See http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/modiﬁ  cation_eligibility.html.
2 The program was established by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.
HUD is working to implement EHLP and hopes to begin accepting homeowner applications soon
(see http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/testimonies/2011/2011-03-02b). 2
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years.3 Loss of income is now a primary cause of mortgage 
defaults; for borrowers who had an affordable mortgage prior 
to the loss, income assistance may be preferable to mortgage 
modiﬁ  cation as a way to minimize default risk.
While it is too soon to evaluate fully the effectiveness of HAMP 
and EHLP, some comparisons can be made with a more estab-
lished, state-level assistance program. EHLP in particular shares a 
number of features with the Homeowners’ Emergency Mortgage 
Assistance Program (HEMAP), a Pennsylvania initiative that 
provides temporary ﬁ  nancial assistance to borrowers who become 
delinquent on their mortgages because of unemployment or other 
ﬁ  nancial hardship beyond their control. HEMAP has operated 
in Pennsylvania for more than twenty-ﬁ  ve years, so a solid track 
record of its performance is available to examine. 
In this edition of Current Issues, we review the structure 
and performance of HEMAP and suggest some features of the 
state program that could help inform federal efforts to address 
the problem of delinquent unemployed borrowers. A measure 
of HEMAP’s success is that the majority of participants have 
remained in their homes and ultimately paid off their loans. The 
effectiveness of this form of assistance, however, is likely linked 
to the program’s careful screening process, which limits partici-
pation to applicants with a good mortgage payment history and 
a high likelihood of resuming their full mortgage payments 
within two years. For these applicants, the program appears 
to provide a useful alternative to loan modification. 
Our analysis also offers a comparison of HEMAP and HAMP. 
Using a hypothetical example of a borrower who becomes 
delinquent in making mortgage payments during an interval 
of unemployment, we show that the budgetary cost of making 
a HEMAP loan can be substantially lower than the cost of a 
permanent HAMP modiﬁ  cation. We also discuss key differences 
between HEMAP loans and loans provided through HUD’s 
EHLP initiative.
In the article’s ﬁ  nal section, we suggest a number of reﬁ  ne-
ments to HEMAP that policymakers might wish to consider if a 
similar program were to be implemented elsewhere. These reﬁ  ne-
ments include improving the targeting and timing of program 
beneﬁ  ts as well as tightening the loan approval criteria. Such 
steps should help lower the risk of delinquencies and defaults 
and also reduce the size of the loans needed by borrowers. The 
extension of loans to negative equity borrowers—homeowners 
who owe more on their mortgages than their homes are worth—
3 A similarly tailored program of temporary assistance to delinquent borrowers 
who face a loss of income is operated by the Government of Ireland. The Mortgage 
Interest Supplement Program provides loans to eligible borrowers to pay the 
interest portion of their mortgage while they seek reemployment (see http://
www.citizensinformation.ie/en/social_welfare/social_welfare_payments/
supplementary_welfare_schemes/mortgage_interest_supplement.html).
has not been a feature of HEMAP. If similar programs were put 
into effect in states where steep declines in home values have 
left many homeowners in a negative equity position, administrators 
would likely have to make loans to these borrowers contingent upon 
mortgage lenders’ willingness to reduce the principal on the loan. 
Origins of HEMAP 
The Pennsylvania Homeowners’ Emergency Mortgage Assis-
tance Program was established by the Pennsylvania Foreclosure 
Prevention Act 91 of 1983 and signed into law on December 23, 
1983. One of the program’s stated objectives was to prevent 
distressed home sales, which were believed to be very damaging 
to many communities in the state. HEMAP was designed to help 
homeowners who, through no fault of their own, are temporarily 
unable to make full mortgage payments and thus are in danger of 
losing their home to foreclosure. The cause of the ﬁ  nancial hard-
ship is not limited to unemployment, but includes other factors 
such as illness, divorce, and labor strikes. The program is admin-
istered by the Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency (PHFA) and 
funded by a combination of annual state appropriations and the 
repayment of principal and interest on existing HEMAP loans.4 
At the time HEMAP was established, the labor market in 
Pennsylvania had been deteriorating for several years. Statewide, 
total employment had been declining since the start of the decade 
and the unemployment rate by late 1983 had reached more than 
13 percent, about two percentage points above the national rate 
(Chart 1). Within the state, unemployment rates were particularly 
high in Pittsburgh, at more than 16 percent, and Allentown, at 
more than 15 percent (Chart 2). Cyclical increases in unem-
ployment rates were compounded at that time by the adverse 
effects of structural changes in several major industries in the 
Pennsylvania economy, including steel and transportation. The 
duration of state unemployment was also relatively high in 1983: 
roughly 4 percent of the labor force—about twice the comparable 
U.S. rate—had been unemployed more than twenty-six weeks.5 
Since the mid-1980s, the unemployment rate in Pennsylvania 
has roughly matched that of the nation, though in the current 
downturn it has not risen as much. 
The housing market in Pennsylvania had been weakening prior 
to the adoption of HEMAP. Nationally, nominal home price growth 
rates had slowed from an annual rate of approximately 15 percent 
to about 2 percent between 1980 and 1983, and a similar slowing 
was seen in metropolitan areas in Pennsylvania (Chart 3). Growth 
rates in the Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Allentown areas were 
quite volatile in this period, but they followed a broadly similar 
4 More details on HEMAP’s operation are available at http://www.phfa.org/
consumers/homeowners/hemap.aspx.
5 Calculations are from the Current Population Survey, 1983 outgoing rotation groups. pattern of weakness before beginning to recover in 1984.6 The 
slowing in home price growth during this period contrasts with 
the outright declines in home prices since late 2007, both nation-
ally and in several major housing markets in the state. Mortgage 
delinquencies and foreclosures also began to rise in late 1982 and 
into 1983. Statewide, the share of outstanding mortgages delin-
quent either ninety days or more or in foreclosure rose from about 
1.0 percent to close to 2.0 percent between 1980 and 1983 (Chart 4). 
6 The index of home price growth rates is constructed from CoreLogic Loan 
Performance data and is based on repeat, nondistressed property sales. 
Operation of HEMAP 
An unemployed borrower entering the HEMAP loan process 
goes through several steps, and the program can begin to 
provide assistance roughly nine months after unemployment 
begins (see exhibit on page 4). Borrowers can initiate the ap-
plication process for a HEMAP loan when they become sixty 
days delinquent on their mortgage. In general, the length of 
time between the income loss and the beginning of assistance 
depends on the length of time the unemployed borrower man-
ages to keep paying the mortgage before becoming sixty days 
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Source: Moody’s Economy.com.
Note: The vertical bands indicate periods designated national recessions
by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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Chart 2
Unemployment Rate: Pennsylvania Metro Areas
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by the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Chart 3
House Price Growth: Pennsylvania Metro Areas
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Chart 4
Seriously Delinquent Mortgages: Pennsylvania
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delinquent as well as the length of time it takes to determine 
eligibility after an application has been ﬁ  led.7 
Determining Eligibility for a HEMAP Loan 
Lenders are required to notify borrowers (“Act 91 notice”) of their 
eligibility to apply for a HEMAP loan when they become sixty 
days delinquent on a mortgage. After receiving notiﬁ  cation, a bor-
rower has thirty-three days to meet face to face with a consumer 
credit counseling agency, after which the agency has thirty days 
to forward an application to the PHFA. Applications are care-
fully screened for the borrower’s mortgage payment history and 
reemployment prospects. Currently, HEMAP eligibility is based 
on property and borrower characteristics. The property must be a 
one- or two-family owner-occupied residence located in Pennsyl-
vania.8 The property cannot be encumbered by more than two 
loans. The borrower must meet all of the following requirements: 
be suffering ﬁ  nancial hardship due to circumstances  • 
beyond his or her control, including unemployment, illness, 
or divorce;
have a reasonable prospect of resuming full mortgage  • 
payments within twenty-four months, or thirty-six months 
in periods of high unemployment;
be a permanent resident of Pennsylvania; • 
have a favorable mortgage credit history prior to the  • 
current ﬁ  nancial hardship, meaning the homeowner should 
not have been delinquent for more than three months 
within the past ﬁ  ve years unless that delinquency was due 
to circumstances deemed to be beyond the homeowner’s 
control; and
be no more than twenty-four months delinquent or require  • 
no more than $60,000 to make the mortgage current.
A borrower’s ability to meet the last three eligibility criteria 
can be determined readily through loan and payment documen-
tation from the lender. However, verifying the ﬁ  rst two criteria, 
7 The program provides eligible borrowers with a noncontinuing loan to make 
the mortgage current and a continuing loan to provide assistance with monthly 
mortgage payments. 
8 Borrowers with an FHA Title II mortgage for mobile or manufactured homes 
are ineligible.
associated with ﬁ  nancial hardship and the potential to resume 
full mortgage payments, requires program administrators to 
obtain evidence from other sources and to apply their judgment. 
Workers who quit their jobs or who are ﬁ  red for cause are ineli-
gible for a HEMAP loan. With regard to other forms of ﬁ  nancial 
hardship, the program administrators would likely have to gather 
other documentary evidence. Determining an unemployed 
worker’s prospects for reemployment in the same geographic 
location is more difﬁ  cult. Reemployment prospects in the same 
local labor market are important because HEMAP was designed 
in part as a way of keeping workers in their homes while they 
sought reemployment. 
HEMAP Administration
Lenders and borrowers have responsibilities under the Pennsylva-
nia Foreclosure Prevention Act, and meeting those responsibilities 
prevents the taking of any legal action to foreclose on the property. 
Recall that the lender is required to notify any eligible borrower 
when the mortgage is sixty days delinquent. The borrower is 
required to arrange for and attend a face-to-face meeting with a 
consumer credit counseling agency within thirty-three days of 
receipt of the notice, and the counseling agency helps the borrower 
prepare the HEMAP application. The lender cannot pursue legal 
action against the borrower’s property during that thirty-three-day 
period and for an additional thirty days after the borrower’s meet-
ing with the counseling agency. 
During the application process, the borrower is required to 
provide general financial information, including tax returns, 
outstanding credit balances and payments, an itemized listing 
of living expenses, and a verification of employment status. 
Upon certification that the property and borrower meet the 
guidelines for participation, a HEMAP loan is authorized, 
which brings the mortgage current by paying off arrearages, 
court costs, and attorney fees incurred by the lender. The 
loan proceeds go directly to the lender. For a continuing loan, 
the total monthly mortgage payments made to the lender/
servicer remain the same but the borrower’s contribution to 
the mortgage payment is capped at 40 percent of his or her 
“net effective income.”9 If the borrower’s net effective income 
changes over the loan period, then the monthly loan payments 
9 Net effective income is gross income, including any unemployment insurance 
beneﬁ  ts, minus federal, state, and local income taxes. 
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and either approved or rejected
Note: HEMAP is the Pennsylvania Homeowners’ Emergency Mortgage Assistance Program.  www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues   5
are adjusted accordingly. Payments are made to the lender/
servicer on behalf of the borrower for a period of up to 
twenty-four months, with a cap of $60,000 on total payments. 
This loan term can be extended to thirty-six months in periods 
of high unemployment rates (when the Pennsylvania rate is 
or exceeds 6.5 percent), and the borrower’s contribution is 
lowered to 35 percent.10 The interest rate on HEMAP loans 
varies over time with market conditions; it is 5.25 percent for 
loans originated in 2010.
The structure of the loan makes the PHFA a lienholder on 
the property behind the ﬁ  rst and possibly a second lienholder. 
The loan is nonrecourse; thus, if the property is ultimately sold 
in foreclosure, the state may see losses if the proceeds are 
insufﬁ  cient to reimburse it for the full value of the loan.11 In a 
number of circumstances, a HEMAP loan can be terminated by 
the administrator, making the entire loan balance immediately 
due. One is when the borrower fails to make a mortgage payment 
on time for reasons unrelated to his or her ﬁ  nancial condition. 
A second is when the borrower no longer occupies the residence. 
A third circumstance occurs when the mortgagor is able to 
10 This extension clause is an added source of ﬂ  exibility in HEMAP, because it 
recognizes the potential for spells of unemployment to lengthen during periods 
of high unemployment. 
11 The borrower may choose to continue to make the HEMAP loan payments, in 
which case the state will not send an adverse report to the credit rating agencies.
establish credit and the loan administrator determines that there 
is sufﬁ  cient equity in the property for the mortgagor to reﬁ  nance 
at reasonable rates and terms. Failure to repay the loan in these 
circumstances is counted against the borrower’s credit standing. 
HEMAP Beneﬁ  ts and Costs
Lending to an unemployed borrower is a risky proposition—
one that private lenders would decline to undertake. If a public 
program makes these loans with an eye to protecting taxpayer 
dollars, then the approval rate will likely be low. Since HEMAP’s 
introduction in 1983, roughly 183,000 mortgagors have applied 
for a loan and 43,000, or about 23 percent, have been approved 
(Table 1).12 On average, 85 percent of denials are triggered by the 
applicant’s circumstances, such as being ﬁ  red from his or her job, 
quitting voluntarily, or lacking reasonable prospects of resuming 
full mortgage payments within twenty-four or thirty-six months 
based on income history. In 2009, for example, 14,000 borrowers 
applied for HEMAP loans and 3,250, or 23 percent, were approved. 
About 15 percent of the 2009 applicants were rejected for fail-
ing to provide the proper income and employment veriﬁ  cation 
documents to the administrator. Pennsylvania offers rejected 
applicants free counseling regarding other options available to 
delinquent homeowners. 
A key measure of success for HEMAP is the extent to which 
the program prevents unemployed borrowers from losing their 
homes. To date, around 80 percent of HEMAP loan recipients 
have retained ownership of their residences. Also important to 
the program’s ongoing success is the extent to which HEMAP 
loans are repaid.13 Loan repayments are an important source of 
the program’s continued funding, and the high loan repayment 
rate attests to the program administrators’ ability to screen 
applicants on their reemployment prospects.
Funding for HEMAP at the outset was supplied entirely by the 
State of Pennsylvania. The state provided an initial appropria-
tion of $25 million in ﬁ  scal year 1984 to get the program off the 
ground. During ﬁ  scal years 1998-2004—a period when the state 
unemployment rate roughly matched the national average and 
remained below 6.5 percent—the program received no additional 
state funding and relied solely on the proceeds from existing 
loans.14 In ﬁ  scal years 2005-09, total funding for the program 
ranged from $20 million to $25 million. State appropriations 
averaged $10 million annually, and repayment of principal and 
interest accounted for the remainder of the funding. In ﬁ  scal year 
2010, which ended on June 30, an additional $5 million was made 
available to Pennsylvania by the federal government through the 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program. The annual 
12 Figures are based on data available through October 2009.
13 All HEMAP participants had experienced a loss of income; however, we do 
not have data on their demographic and other characteristics and experiences 
to conduct a more complete evaluation of the program’s effectiveness. 












Inactive/no decision 1,593 0.8
Approved 43,147 23.6
Panel B:  Funding Provided, in Millions of Dollars
Fiscal Year
Source 2007 2008 2009 2010
Loan repayments 15.4 11.4 9.1 8.3
State appropriations 10.0 11.0 11.0 11.0
Other fundinga 0.0 0.2 0.3 5.1
Source: Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency.
Note: HEMAP is the Pennsylvania Homeowners’ Emergency Mortgage Assistance 
Program.
aThe American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 made funds available to 
reimburse states for increased costs associated with certain types of assistance they 
provided to low-income families during the recession. In ﬁ  scal year 2010, Pennsylvania 
received $5 million for costs associated with HEMAP.6
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cost of administering HEMAP is about $4.5 million, or $320 per 
application processed. On average, the monthly HEMAP contri-
bution has been roughly $500. 
Comparison of HEMAP and HAMP
In March 2009, the Home Affordable Modiﬁ  cation Program was 
announced with a goal of modifying 3 to 4 million mortgages. 
To date, 580,000 mortgages have received a permanent modiﬁ  -
cation through the federal program. The predominant hardship 
resulting in a HAMP modiﬁ  cation is a loss of income, accounting 
for 60 percent of modiﬁ  cations.15 Certain similarities between 
HAMP and Pennsylvania’s assistance program suggest that a 
comparison of program designs could be worthwhile, and that 
the insight gained could prove beneﬁ  cial to policymakers. 
The objectives of HEMAP and HAMP are to enable the bor-
rower to remain in his or her house during a spell of unemploy-
ment and to avoid a forced sale of the property. However, the 
programs take different approaches to addressing the problem 
of a temporary income shortfall. The HEMAP application 
process, like the HAMP process, begins when the borrower is 
in serious delinquency.16 HEMAP provides assistance in the 
form of a loan to the borrower during the period of unemploy-
ment. No active participation is required of the lender/servicer 
once it refers the borrower to HEMAP. Assistance ends when the 
borrower becomes reemployed, at which time he or she begins 
to repay the loan. 
HAMP provides assistance by modifying the borrower’s 
current mortgage. The borrower’s monthly payment is 
reduced to produce a debt-to-income (DTI) ratio of 0.31.17 
HAMP reaches this lower payment level by reducing the 
interest rate on the mortgage to a minimum of 2 percent, 
increasing the term of the mortgage to a maximum of forty 
years, and, if necessary, providing interest forbearance on 
some portion of the loan balance or providing principal 
forgiveness.18 These adjustments to the mortgage reduce the 
amount received by the lender/servicer and remain in effect 
for five years, independent of when the borrower may return 
to employment (or full employment). After meeting the quali-
fication requirements, a borrower is first given a temporary 
15 See http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/ﬁ  nancial-stability/results/
MHA-Reports/Documents/Dec%202010%20MHA%20Report%20Final.pdf.
16 A borrower may also qualify for a HAMP modiﬁ  cation if he or she is current 
or less than sixty days delinquent on the mortgage, but faces imminent default.
17 The borrower’s monthly debt is inclusive of taxes and insurance. The DTI ratio 
of 0.31 is similar to the HEMAP target of 40 percent given that HEMAP uses 
income net of taxes while HAMP does not.
18 The principal reduction alternative (PRA) component of HAMP began in 
October 2010; through the PRA, principal reduction is considered before interest 
rate reductions and loan term extensions to reduce monthly payments for 
negative equity borrowers (see https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/
docs/hamp_servicer/sd1014.pdf).
modification and then must make three monthly payments on 
time to have the modification made permanent.
Because the mortgage must be modiﬁ  ed, HAMP requires the 
involvement of the lender/servicer. The program provides a series 
of ﬁ  nancial incentives to encourage participation. There is an up-
front fee of $1,000 paid to the lender/servicer for each permanent 
modiﬁ  cation. There is also a series of “pay-for-performance” fees. 
In the ﬁ  rst three years after a permanent modiﬁ  cation, HAMP 
pays $1,000 to the lender/servicer each year if the borrower 
remains current. The borrower accrues credits of $1,000 a year for 
up to ﬁ  ve years that can be used to reduce the mortgage balance 
if the loan remains current after the permanent modiﬁ  cation. 
We compare the two approaches by providing a detailed 
example (Table 2). We consider a household that purchases a 
$220,000 home and takes out a $200,000 mortgage to finance 
the purchase. The interest rate on the mortgage is 6 percent 
and the monthly payment, including property taxes and home 
insurance, is $1,382. There are two earners in the household, 
with the principal earner bringing in 70 percent of the total 
income. The household’s combined monthly pretax income is 
$4,608. These figures imply that the DTI ratio on the mortgage 
is 0.30. Given the earners’ combined incomes, the household 






House value 220,000  210,000  210,000  210,000 
Mortgage balance  200,000  194,936  205,728  192,876 
Monthly income  4,608  2,673  2,673  2,327a
Interest rate (percent)  6.00 6.00 2.24 6.00
Taxes and insurance  183  183  183  183 
Principal and interest  1,199  1,199  645  1,199 
Principal, interest, 
taxes, and insurance  1,382  1,382  828  930b
DTI ratio 0.30 0.52 0.31 0.40
HEMAP loan  14,856 
Program cost per 
mortgage 13,588  1,620 
Annual interest subsidy 6,697  0 
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Figures are in dollars except where noted. HAMP is the Home Affordable 
Modiﬁ  cation Program; HEMAP is the Pennsylvania Homeowners’ Emergency 
Mortgage Assistance Program. The program cost assumes that the borrower does 
not redefault on the modiﬁ  ed mortgage or the HEMAP loan; it does not include 
administrative costs.  
aAfter-tax income assuming a 25 percent  tax rate on earned income.
bAmount paid by borrower excluding HEMAP subsidy.  www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues   7
Two years after the purchase of the house, the value has 
declined to $210,000 and the principal earner becomes unem-
ployed. The earner receives unemployment insurance beneﬁ  ts, 
but the household’s monthly income is now reduced to $2,673.19 
This raises the DTI ratio to 0.52. Consequently, the household is 
unable to make its mortgage payments, and after sixty days of 
delinquency it applies for assistance. Nine months following the 
earner’s job loss, either a HAMP modiﬁ  cation is granted or
a HEMAP loan is approved.
Features of a HAMP Loan Modiﬁ  cation
Assume that the household applies for and is granted a HAMP 
modiﬁ  cation. The interest rate on the new mortgage, which now 
includes a total of $10,792 in arrearages, is reduced to 2.24 per-
cent and the term is increased to forty years (see Table 2). The 
combination reduces the monthly principal and interest pay-
ment from $1,199 to $645, or $554 less per month, and the total 
monthly payment inclusive of taxes and insurance falls to $828.20 
This lower monthly payment reduces the DTI ratio from 0.52 to 
0.31. The lower monthly payment under the HAMP modiﬁ  ca-
tion stays in effect for up to ﬁ  ve years. The lender/servicer sees a 
reduction in the amount of interest received over the ﬁ  ve-year 
period, which is partially offset by its incentives to participate. 
The cost to the government includes these incentives to the lender/
servicer plus half the cost of the reduction of the DTI ratio from 
0.38 to 0.31. In this case, the latter cost is $188 per month and 
the federal government pays half, or $94, to the lender. If the 
household makes all of its monthly payments in a timely manner 
during these ﬁ  ve years,  the discounted cost to the government of 
the HAMP modiﬁ  cation is about $13,600.21
Features of a HEMAP Loan
Now assume, as we do in Table 2, that the household applies for 
a HEMAP loan rather than a HAMP modiﬁ  cation. In this case, 
the terms of the mortgage are unaffected. Instead, the borrower 
uses the loan to pay off the arrearages, making him or her current 
on the mortgage, while a payment of $452 per month is made by 
HEMAP to the lender. This reduces the DTI (after-tax) ratio on 
the mortgage to 0.40—a reduction equivalent to that achieved 
under HAMP.  Assume also that nine months after participating 
19 We set the unemployment insurance beneﬁ  t at 40 percent of the worker’s 
former monthly earnings.
20 The median reduction in monthly payments for a permanent HAMP modiﬁ  cation 
is $522 (see http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/ﬁ  nancial-stability/results/
MHA-Reports/Documents/Dec%202010%20MHA%20Report%20Final.pdf).
21 This ﬁ  gure includes $5,000 credited to the borrower toward his or her 
mortgage. We assume that the government’s cost of funds is 3 percent, which we 
use to discount the HAMP subsidies when calculating the discounted cost.
in the program, the unemployed borrower ﬁ  nds a job.22 The loan 
payments stop and the household begins to pay off the HEMAP 
loan. The total loan balance is $14,856, comprising $10,792 that 
was used to pay off the arrearages on the mortgage and $4,068 in 
accumulated monthly payments.
To determine the monthly repayment amount for a HEMAP 
loan, the program calculates the borrower’s “total housing ex-
pense,” which is the sum of the monthly principal, interest, mort-
gage taxes, house insurance, and utilities. Currently, if 35 percent 
of the household’s reemployment earnings exceeds its total 
housing expense by at least $25, then the household’s monthly 
payment is the difference between the two. In this case, interest 
on the HEMAP loan begins to apply, with the current interest rate 
set at 5.25 percent. If the difference between the two is less than 
$25, then the household makes a minimum monthly repayment 
of $25 and no interest is charged to the loan. 
Assume that the primary earner is reemployed at an income 
that is 90 percent of his or her prior income. Here, 35 percent of 
the household’s monthly income is $1,500. If monthly utilities are 
$100, then the household’s total housing expense is $1,482. The 
household would then make the minimum monthly repayment 
amount of $25. The effective DTI ratio for the household during 
this repayment period is 0.33. 
A borrower making the minimum monthly payment, even at 
zero interest, would require forty-ﬁ  ve years to completely pay off 
the loan. The duration of the repayment period, then, is determined 
by the amount of time needed for the borrower’s home equity to 
reach a sufﬁ  cient level for the household to reﬁ  nance and pay off 
the remaining HEMAP balance. Assuming conservatively no house 
price appreciation and reﬁ  nancing by the borrower into a Federal 
Housing Authority loan with a minimum down-payment, the loan 
could be prepaid in about forty months. With some house price 
appreciation, this duration would be shorter. Taking into account all 
of the cash ﬂ  ows—including payments made to make the home-
owner current, HEMAP’s monthly contributions, the $25 minimum 
payments made by the homeowner, and the remaining balance 
based on a forty-month repayment period—the discounted cost 
to Pennsylvania of the HEMAP loan is around $1,600.23
22 We assume that participants receive unemployment insurance beneﬁ  ts for 
the entire nine months of their unemployment spell, implying a thirteen-week 
extension of the regular twenty-six-week beneﬁ  t period. In the current downturn, 
the federal government extended the basic state beneﬁ  t period well beyond thirty-
nine weeks. Between 1983 and 1985, eligible unemployed workers in Pennsylvania 
could receive beneﬁ  ts for up to forty-two weeks and, as a result of a federal 
supplemental program, could extend this period for up to ﬁ  fty-ﬁ  ve weeks in 1983 
(information supplied to the authors by the Pennsylvania Department of Labor 
and Industry). 
23 Here again, we assume that the state’s cost of funds is 3 percent, which we use 
to discount the HEMAP cash ﬂ  ows.8
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Issues Associated with a HAMP-HEMAP Comparison
The biggest difference to emerge from our comparison of the 
two approaches to providing assistance is the cost to the govern-
ment. The HAMP approach of using cash payments to encourage 
lenders/servicers to modify the loan yielded a discounted cost 
of about $13,600 over the ﬁ  ve-year modiﬁ  cation period. If the 
household redefaults during the period, then the discounted cost 
would be lower. In contrast, the HEMAP approach of providing a 
loan yielded a discounted cost of $1,600. The HEMAP loan is also 
tailored to the length of unemployment, whereas the period of the 
HAMP modiﬁ  cation is ﬁ  xed in advance, regardless of how long 
unemployment lasts. The lender/servicer incurs little or no cost 
under HEMAP, since the loan keeps the borrower current; under 
HAMP, the lender experiences losses associated with the lower 
interest rate on the modiﬁ  ed loan and, possibly, with the lower 
principal payments for the modiﬁ  cation period. Finally, unlike a 
HEMAP loan, a HAMP modiﬁ  cation provides the household with 
a below-market interest rate for a ﬁ  ve-year period. This amounts 
to giving the household an annual interest rate subsidy of nearly 
$6,700 as long as the household does not move. This in-place 
ﬁ  nancial subsidy could reduce the household’s mobility.24 In 
contrast, the HEMAP loan does not have the same in-place ﬁ  nan-
cial incentives and thus imposes fewer constraints on household 
mobility, because the homeowner can repay the loan even if he 
or she leaves the state.
HAMP’s relatively short period of operation complicates our 
comparison of HEMAP loan outcomes with those of HAMP loan 
modiﬁ  cations.25 In addition, the percentage of HAMP modiﬁ  ca-
tions made to negative equity borrowers was much higher than the 
comparable percentage for HEMAP loans. Recall that to date, the 
repayment rate for HEMAP loans is around 80 percent. Ultimately, 
the success of HAMP can be measured by the percentage of 
families that avoid foreclosure. An intermediate success measure 
is the percentage of HAMP permanent modiﬁ  cations that do not 
redefault over the ﬁ  ve-year period in which the modiﬁ  cation is in 
effect. Each of these two success measures will require many years 
of data to evaluate fully.
Designing a Program of Financial Assistance
for Unemployed Homeowners
A key focus of current national housing policy is keeping home-
owners in their residences in the face of a job loss or other ﬁ  nancial 
hardship. While mortgage modiﬁ  cations have gained support as 
the conventional policy to aid homeowners, our examination of 
24 Ferreira, Gyourko, and Tracy (2010) ﬁ  nd that each $1,000 of in-place ﬁ  nancial 
subsidies reduces a household’s two-year mobility rate by 12 percent. The HAMP 
subsidy in our example would generate an estimated 80 percent reduction in 
a household’s two-year mobility rate over the ﬁ  ve-year period in which the 
permanent modiﬁ  cation is in effect.
25 The ﬁ  rst cohort of permanent HAMP modiﬁ  cations was made in November 2009.
Pennsylvania’s HEMAP suggests that loans that tide borrowers 
through a temporary period of ﬁ  nancial hardship are a poten-
tially attractive alternative approach to preventing foreclosures, 
particularly for unemployed borrowers with a good payment his-
tory and sound prospects for resuming their mortgage payments. 
Policymakers considering the design of efforts to assist 
borrowers suffering ﬁ  nancial hardship can look to the HEMAP 
experience to offer guidance in several areas. With regard to the 
target population, programs of ﬁ  nancial assistance are likely to 
be more efﬁ  cient if focused on those experiencing ﬁ  nancial hard-
ship due to unemployment. A minority of HEMAP participants 
experienced hardship unrelated to a job loss, while almost half of 
participants who ultimately failed to repay their loan cited factors 
other than unemployment as their reason for default. Hardship 
resulting from factors such as serious illness or divorce may be 
better handled in programs tailored to those speciﬁ  c needs.
A program targeted to the unemployed could also allow the 
assistance to be better timed. Many workers apply for unemploy-
ment insurance beneﬁ  ts within a week or two of losing their job; 
the unemployment insurance application could simultaneously 
trigger an application for mortgage assistance. With a more 
timely determination of loan eligibility, lenders/servicers would 
see fewer delinquencies and the loan amount would likely be 
lower because there would be less need for funds to cover arrear-
ages. In addition, borrowers eligible for ﬁ  nancial assistance would 
not have to exhaust their savings or take on other forms of debt 
in attempting to remain current. 
A feature of distressed housing markets outside of Pennsyl-
vania is the sizable fraction of borrowers who are in negative 
equity. This has not been an important part of the historical 
experience with HEMAP. Home price growth in Pennsylvania 
in the early 1980s was weak, but the state did not see the kind 
of sharp declines that have occurred in the past several years 
in states such as California, Arizona, or Florida. Unemployed 
borrowers in negative equity present a challenge to programs 
like HEMAP. In these cases, a “HEMAP-like” loan would essen-
tially be unsecured; as such, the loan would carry substantially 
greater risk. 
To address this issue, HEMAP administrators could stipulate 
that, as a condition of the loan, the lender/servicer reduce the 
principal on the mortgage to bring the mortgage balance down to 
the current value of the house. When a negative equity borrower 
is employed, the lender/servicer may be reluctant to write down 
principal on the premise that the borrower is likely to continue to 
make the monthly mortgage payments. However, the incentive for 
the lender/servicer to write down principal increases signiﬁ  cantly 
once a negative equity borrower experiences a job loss. Moreover, 
the potential to qualify the borrower for a HEMAP loan, which 
insures the borrower’s ability to make the mortgage payments for 
at least two years, is additional incentive for the lender/servicer   www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues   9
to agree to write down the mortgage balance. Writing down the 
balance on the mortgage will also reduce the size of the HEMAP 
loan, since the borrower’s monthly payments will be reduced.26 
Once a loan is made, the timely repayment of principal and 
interest becomes an issue. Under HEMAP, default rates on loans 
have been on the order of 20 percent. Nevertheless, the potential 
for defaults suggests that limits on a borrower’s total monthly 
recurring debt-to-income ratio, or back-end DTI, might be intro-
duced. Neither HEMAP nor HAMP places explicit caps on back-
end DTIs when determining eligibility.27 Future loan programs 
might want to consider imposing a maximum back-end ratio on 
borrowers in order to achieve a certain comfort level regarding 
the borrower’s ability to repay the loan. 
HUD’s Emergency Homeowners’ Loan Program has been 
in operation for only a short time, so program data are not yet 
available. Still, EHLP bears many similarities to HEMAP in that 
it provides short-term assistance to eligible delinquent borrow-
ers to pay off arrearages and bridge monthly payment shortfalls 
following a signiﬁ  cant loss of income. There are key differences, 
however—namely, EHLP does not charge interest on the loan and 
it allows a borrower to earn credits to offset the total loan balance 
if he or she stays current on the ﬁ  rst mortgage for ﬁ  ve years. Thus, 
the program is likely to have a much higher discounted cost per 
loan than HEMAP would. Moreover, EHLP’s ﬁ  nancial incentives 
to keep a borrower in his or her home would likely constrain 
mobility to a much greater extent than HEMAP would. Lending 
under both programs, though, would be subject to higher risk in 
26 This action requires that the value of the property be ascertained prior to 
HEMAP loan approval. This could be accomplished using automated valuation 
methods rather than more expensive appraisals.
27 HAMP does require borrowers to receive credit counseling when the ratio 
is 0.55 or higher.
cases where the borrower is in negative equity and would likely 
be contingent upon some form of principal reduction. 
Conclusion
Interventions to reduce foreclosures are most effective when they 
address the source of the problem. Approaches that modify the 
mortgage are sound if the borrower—even when employed—
has difﬁ  culty affording the mortgage. If the borrower can afford 
the mortgage but has suffered a temporary reduction in income 
because of unemployment, then the provision of ﬁ  nancing to the 
borrower during the spell of unemployment may be preferable 
to mortgage modiﬁ  cation as a form of assistance. Lending to 
unemployed borrowers, however, is generally risky and unlikely 
to be undertaken on a large scale by private sector lenders. 
Nevertheless, Pennsylvania’s experience with the Homeowners’ 
Emergency Mortgage Assistance Program suggests that lending 
by the government to a carefully screened group of unemployed 
borrowers can be a successful strategy to reduce foreclosures. The 
target population can be readily identiﬁ  ed through unemploy-
ment insurance claims ﬁ  led at the time of layoff, and the program 
can be timed to kick in before the borrower becomes seriously 
delinquent or in foreclosure. The duration of the lending can be 
ﬂ  exible and adapted to the individual experiences of unemployed 
borrowers. 
The authors thank Brian Hudson and staff at the Pennsylvania 
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questions on HEMAP.  For data on extended unemployment 
benefits in the early 1980s, the authors thank Danielle Bowser 
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Second Chances: Subprime Mortgage Modiﬁ  cation
and Re-Default
Andrew Haughwout, Ebiere Okah, and Joseph Tracy
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 417, 
December 2009
Mortgage modiﬁ  cations have become an important component 
of public interventions designed to reduce foreclosures. In this 
paper, the authors examine how the structure of a mortgage 
modiﬁ  cation affects the likelihood of the modiﬁ  ed mortgage 
re-defaulting over the next year. Using data on subprime modi-
ﬁ  cations that precede the government’s Home Affordable Modiﬁ  ca-
tion Program, they focus on those modiﬁ  cations in which the 
borrower was seriously delinquent and the monthly payment was 
reduced as part of the modiﬁ  cation. The average re-default rate 
over the twelve months following the modiﬁ  cation is 56 percent. The 
data indicate that the re-default rate declines with the magnitude 
of the reduction in the monthly payment, but also that the re-
default rate declines relatively more when the payment reduction 
is achieved through principal forgiveness as opposed to lower 
interest rates. 
The Homeownership Gap
Andrew Haughwout, Richard Peach, and Joseph Tracy
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Current Issues in Economics 
and Finance 16, no. 5, May 2010
Recent years have seen a sharp rise in the number of negative 
equity homeowners—those who owe more on their mortgages 
than their houses are worth. These homeowners are included in 
the ofﬁ  cial homeownership rate computed by the Census Bureau, 
but the savings they must amass to retain their home or purchase 
a new home are daunting. Recognizing that these homeown-
ers are likely to convert to renters over time, the authors of this 
analysis calculate an “effective” rate of homeownership that 
excludes negative equity households. They argue that the effective 
rate—5.6 percentage points below the ofﬁ  cial rate—may be a 
useful guide to the future path of the ofﬁ  cial rate.
MORE ON PUBLIC POLICY APPROACHES TO MORTGAGE RELIEF
Companion Podcast Available 
An interview with the authors of “Help for Unemployed Borrowers: Lessons from the Pennsylvania Homeowners’ Emergency 
Mortgage Assistance Program” is available on the Bank’s website, at http://www.newyorkfed.org/multimedia/audio.html. In the 
interview, the authors provide additional insights into the advantages of the state program and its applicability to mortgage relief 
efforts at the federal level.
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s U.S. Credit Conditions 
website (http://www.newyorkfed.org/creditconditions) offers de-
tailed, timely data on the incidence of mortgage foreclosures and 
delinquencies in the nation and in individual states and counties. 
The information, presented through charts, interactive maps, and 
spreadsheets, is designed to help government agencies, communi-
ty groups, commercial institutions, and other practitioners better 
understand and respond to local conditions associated with failed 
and troubled mortgages.
The website offers many informative features. Visitors can com-
pare delinquency rates across geographical areas and across types 
of mortgages—for example, prime, subprime, or Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac. Similar information is available for credit card 
debt and for student and automobile loans.  In addition, visitors 
can view charts tracking mortgage debt as a share of household 
liabilities or the quarterly changes in new foreclosures by state. 
The Credit Conditions website draws extensively on the FRBNY 
Consumer Credit Panel, a new longitudinal database containing 
credit report information for a group of individuals and house-
holds from 1999 to 2011.
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